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REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE INDOCHINA CONFLICT AS PUBLISHED JANUARY 25, 1972 BY THE WHITE HOUSE AND PRESENTED AT PARIS JANUARY 27, 1972

- There will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the government of South Vietnam within six months of an agreement.
- 2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day the agreement is signed. The release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed when they are completed.

The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam within six months of an agreement. This election will be organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.

One month before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign. The Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the government, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares that it:

- --will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral in the election;
- --will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves;
- -is prepared to define its military and economic assistance

relationship with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

- —South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indochina, should adopt a foreign policy consistent with the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords;
- reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.
- 4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle their own affairs by themselves.
- 5. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.
- 6. There will be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina, to begin when the agreement is signed. As part of the ceasefire, there will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina.
- 7. There will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement including the ceasefire and its provisions, the release of prisoners of w... and innocent civilians, the withdrawal of outside forces from Indochina, and the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.
- 8. There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the status of all the countries in Indochina, and lasting peace in this region.

Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international conference for this and other appropriate purposes.

ment, we will have a continuation of what happened in 1954.

People say they were tricked in 1954. I don't want to enter that debate as to whether they were or not. All I want to say is if they feel that they were taken advantage of, then within a foreseeable future the war will start again. So it is in our interest to have a settlement that takes this into account.

Now the question is: Is there to be another round of warfare? We believe that we can contain the offensive, and it is even possible, maybe even probable, that the reason they make the offensive is as a prelude to a subsequent negotiation. This at least has been their pattern in 1954 and was their pattern in 1968.

So this is an attempt to say to them once again, "It is not necessary. Let's get the war over with now." But our basic decision was made at a time prior to the event....

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you give us, sir, in your judgment, the reason why the North Vietnamese, in dealing with the United States, would insist on the United States reaching comprehensive solutions, including a political solution? Why are they unwilling to negotiate with us, in your judgment, on the military issue and take their chances in settling the political issues with the South Vietnamese?

Dr. Kissinger: The only explanation which I have, and there may be better ones,

is that they apparently are not confident that if military and economic aid continues to South Viet-Nam that they can win their war with the South Vietnamese, because if they were, there is no reason why they should not accept our proposal, as you indicated. What they are, in effect, asking from us is precisely what the President said yesterday:

They are asking us to align ourselves with them, to overthrow the people that have been counting on us in South Viet-Nam. They are asking us to accomplish for them what they seem not confident of being able to achieve for themselves.

That is the only explanation I can give, but I do not absolutely insist on it. It is a curious phenomenon; that is, it is they who